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For myriad reasons, rural entrepreneurs may want to harvest by selling their business. 
While these entrepreneurs may look for inspiration to larger, public deals, there are few 
relevant insights to glean from these deals. Despite the high stakes involved for rural 
entrepreneurs and potential buyers, researchers have placed little attention on 
dealmaking at the lower end of the spectrum. We address this lack of research by 
answering the research question: Why do deals involving small companies go 
unconsummated? Because research on why large deals fall through is sparse and of 
limited applicability, we ground our research using insights from the venture financing 
arena (venture capitalists and angel investors) about why deals between entrepreneurs 
and investors do not close successfully. Applying a novel dataset from an economic 
development effort in a small southwestern U.S. city, we analyze the reasons why an 
investor group investigated 20 potential small deals, but none eventually closed. We 
found that issues both with the potential buyers and sellers led to the deal failures, with 
issues involving the valuation and also the selling entrepreneur being the most common 
deal-breakers. Furthermore, through this investigation, we gained insights into the 
challenges of an investor-driven model for economic development. 
Introduction 
Rural entrepreneurs launch businesses that can allow 
them to prosper financially beyond their non-entrepreneur-
ial neighbors (L. Yu & Artz, 2019). But after successfully 
growing a business or perhaps nearing retirement age, rural 
entrepreneurs may look to harvest by selling their business. 
These entrepreneurs can look for inspiration to some big 
deals involving urban entrepreneurs like John Mackey, who 
eventually sold Whole Foods to Amazon for $13.7 billion, or 
Amnon Shashua and the sale of his Jerusalem-based startup 
called Mobileye to Intel for $15.3 billion. These deals can 
generate incredible wealth for founders and reshape entire 
markets and industries. Accordingly, academic researchers 
have thoroughly investigated issues regarding large merg-
ers and acquisitions such as: the economic rationale (e.g., 
Kim & Singal, 1993; Wang & Zajac, 2007), environmental 
factors (e.g., Thornton, 2001); firm characteristics that mo-
tivate deals (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 
2004); and the various performance outcomes (e.g., Can-
nella & Hambrick, 1993; P. Wright et al., 2002). 
While these large deals may inspire rural entrepreneurs, 
there are perhaps few relevant insights to glean from the 
big deals. Rural entrepreneurs’ deals may reshape local 
economies, but they do not reshape industries. They do 
not involve investment banks or boards of directors. Still, 
even if the transaction price is meager by corporate stan-
dards, the economic stakes may be enormous for rural en-
trepreneurs and prospective buyers. Selling the business 
may represent the single largest monetary transaction of a 
lifetime and may cap decades of work. Unfortunately, re-
searchers have placed little attention to deals at the lower 
end of the spectrum. Specifically, there are few insights in 
the literature regarding why smaller firms like those created 
by rural entrepreneurs do not successfully change hands 
(Ahlers et al., 2016; Bruce & Picard, 2006; Scholes et al., 
2007). Family business research, which includes both large 
and small deals, has identified that more should be known 
about the process and outcomes of divestment efforts (King 
et al., forthcoming; Worek, 2017). 
We seek to address this lack of research by answering 
the research question: Why do deals (a term we use to sig-
nify a transaction involving a change of ownership) involv-
ing small companies go unconsummated, which should ap-
ply to the rural ecosystem? In contrast to large M&A deals, 
where most announced deals do close (e.g., Chakrabarti & 
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Mitchell, 2016), most attempts to close a transaction in-
volving small firms fail (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007). Given 
that the vast majority of firms are small and that a failure 
to successfully find a buyer often results in firm liquidation 
(Leroy et al., 2015), we suggest a study of why potential 
deals do not get done is particularly important. Because 
research on why large deals fall through is limited 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; Shen & Reuer, 2005) and of 
limited applicability (Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001), we ground 
our research using insights from the startup financing arena 
(venture capitalists and angel investors) about why deals 
between entrepreneurs and investors do not close success-
fully. 
Accordingly, the paper first develops the potential mar-
ket for small deals and addresses the potential applicability 
of research into why large deals go unconsummated. The 
paper then builds on insights from venture and angel capi-
tal investments, particularly research into why deals do not 
occur. Applying a novel dataset from an economic develop-
ment effort in a small southwestern U.S. city, we employ a 
case-study approach structured by past empirical research 
to analyze the reasons why an investor group investigated 
20 potential small deals, but none eventually closed. We 
found that issues both with the potential buyers and sellers 
led to the deal failures and also gained insights into a type 
of economic development. 
Literature Review 
This lack of insight on why smaller firms do not suc-
cessfully change hands is not due to a dearth of smaller 
deals. According to data from the Institute for Mergers, Ac-
quisitions and Alliances (IMAA), there were almost 16,000 
M&As in North America in 2019. Only 47 deals worldwide 
had a transaction value of greater than $1 billion, so most 
deals are not at the top of the market. Furthermore, the 
IMAA data are based on publicly announced deals, so many 
small business sales probably are not reflected in these 
numbers. Companies with sales below $150 million are la-
beled as the “lower middle-market” (Slee, 2009). In terms 
of revenue and company size, the vast majority of firms fall 
into the lower middle market’s very bottom tier. NAICS As-
sociation data indicates that only 19 percent of firms with 
annual revenue of over $1 million have annual revenues of 
more than $10 million. That suggests that 81 percent of the 
“million-dollar firms” have annual revenues of less than $10 
million. Similarly, U.S. Census data indicate that, among 
firms with more than five employees, 71 percent of those 
firms have 19 employees or less. These numbers suggest 
that the large majority of potential M&A deals involve com-
panies with annual revenue of less than $10 million and/or 
fewer than 20 employees. 
Not only is the small business universe large, but it is 
also filled with businesses that are considering a sale. A 
2014 PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC) survey indicated that 
20 percent of family businesses were contemplating a sale 
(Leibell, 2015). As only 12 percent of family businesses 
make it to the third generation, there are many sales (or 
failures) of these businesses in the first and second genera-
tion. Furthermore, the business owner’s approaching retire-
ment (Dawson & Barrédy, 2018) and the inability to find a 
feasible successor within a family (De Massis et al., 2008) 
are triggers for a sale. The aging of the baby boomer genera-
tion suggests the opportunity for M&As among small firms 
is already strong and should stay that way for a while. 
While the potential may be high, actual dealmaking 
among these smaller firms is fraught with false starts and 
failures. In one survey, private equity firms indicated that 
only 16 percent of the Letters of Intent (LOI) signed with a 
prospective seller, which stipulated the terms of a possible 
sale, led to a completed sale (Anderson et al., 2007). One di-
rector of a middle-market investment banking firm likened 
the M&A business to hunting: “Sometimes you bag big 
game—but more often than not, the target runs away un-
harmed” (Slee, 2009: 13). Actually, the target may run away, 
but it may not be unharmed. Leroy and colleagues (Leroy 
et al., 2015) found that 62 percent of entrepreneurs who 
attempted to sell their business ended up liquidating the 
business instead, missing out on the financial and emo-
tional benefits of a successful deal. 
Extant research into why larger deals do not happen is 
limited (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; Shen & Reuer, 2005; 
Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001). In part, this may be because the 
vast majority of announced deals among larger, public com-
panies do close. For example, Wong & O’Sullivan (2001) 
found that 95 percent of friendly takeover bids succeeded, 
and even around 50 percent of hostile takeover bids suc-
ceeded. Other research found that three-quarters of domes-
tic and two-thirds of cross-border proposed tie-ups closed 
(Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016). For the smaller number of 
deals that did not close, the main reasons included geog-
raphy (too distant) and deal type (hostile and/or too unre-
lated) (Muehlfeld et al., 2012). Even these limited findings 
may not be too applicable to small deals due to the signifi-
cantly higher levels of information asymmetry in small ver-
sus large deals (Anderson et al., 2007; Moore Jr et al., 1995; 
Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001). 
Decision-making Processes for Small Deals: 
Insights From Venture Financing 
The decision-making processes used by Venture Capi-
talists (VCs) and Business Angels (BAs) to invest in young 
companies could be informative for decisions surrounding 
the purchase of more mature companies. Private equity (PE) 
companies, which are primarily known for purchasing 
larger mature businesses, use the same decision processes 
as do VCs and BAs when they are investing (Dawson, 2011), 
including screening, due diligence, and negotiations. PE in-
vestors use heuristics to make decisions, as do BAs and 
VCs (Harrison et al., 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Sinyard 
et al., 2020). The deal closure rates for VCs, BAs and PEs 
are also similar. Investing in startups and mature compa-
nies entails screening many possible candidates, with po-
tential investors eliminating approximately 70 percent of 
the candidates at the first stage. The promising survivors of 
the first screen then undergo a more in-depth investigation, 
with only a small percentage of successful deals emerging 
from the process (Anderson et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2017; 
M. Wright et al., 2009). The BA population, who are pri-
marily successful business owners, are also the same peo-
ple who might consider purchasing an existing business (or 
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investing in another individual trying to enter the ranks 
of the business owner). Although purchasing an existing 
business removes some of the risk associated with startups, 
there is still considerable risk involved as purchasers often 
plan to expand and innovate in the current business, signif-
icantly growing profitability in the process (Dawson & Bar-
rédy, 2018; Scholes et al., 2007). Accordingly, buyers and in-
vestors are evaluating the venture’s growth and profitability 
potential in both startups and mature businesses. 
Researchers have studied VC and BA decision-making for 
four decades (see Petty & Gruber, 2011 for a summary of VC 
research and Maxwell et al., 2011 for BAs). A recent shift in 
focus from why deals do close to why deals do not success-
fully close is particularly helpful for investigating business 
sales by rural entrepreneurs. Maxwell and colleagues (2011) 
found that BAs use an “elimination-by-aspects” approach 
to deal evaluation, particularly when initially screening 
deals. This means potential investors search for reasons to 
say no rather than reasons to say yes. Petty & Gruber (2011) 
used this same elimination-by-aspects approach to study 
VC decision-making. Using an initial framework of four cat-
egories for reasons to say no (product, market, team, and fi-
nancial), the study used a qualitative approach to derive a 
grid of categories and sub-categories for why VCs did not 
consummate a deal with the entrepreneurs. Carpentier & 
Suret (2015) used Petty and Gruber’s (2011) grid as a start-
ing point to investigate why BAs reject deals. We employ 
those findings to ground this study of why prospective deals 
are not consummated for small businesses. Furthermore, 
we go beyond Petty & Gruber (2011) and Carpentier & Suret 
(2015), who assumed that, when investigating deals, eval-
uators’ decisions were homogeneous. Instead, by analyzing 
the decision heterogeneity of the evaluators, which may 
contribute to deal-breakers, we may offer a more fine-
grained analysis. 
VCs and BAs use multiple stages in the decision-making 
process. The first stage, most commonly called the pre-
screening stage, eliminates 60-70 percent of the proposed 
deals (e.g Croce et al., 2017; Mason et al., 2017; Petty & 
Gruber, 2011). In BA groups, it is common for a hired staff 
member to conduct the pre-screening evaluations. Some BA 
groups use as many as five discrete stages after the initial 
screening (Carpentier & Suret, 2015), while others suggest 
there are only one (Mason & Botelho, 2016) or two addi-
tional stages (Croce et al., 2017). In general, the process 
is that BAs and VCs seek further information on the deals 
that pass pre-screening and ultimately focus on negotiating 
deals with fewer than 10 percent of the originally proposed 
deals. 
Why do VCs and BAs Reject Deals 
While there is consensus about the percentages of how 
many prospects make it through the various stages, there 
is less consensus about the reasons why BAs and VCs reject 
potential deals. Petty & Gruber (2011) suggested that in-
vestors use heuristics mainly in the early stages of deal 
screening, while others found evidence, particularly among 
highly experienced investors, of heuristics usage later in the 
detailed evaluation of potential deals. These more experi-
enced investors also focus on different criteria when eval-
uating prospects than less experienced investors (Harrison 
et al., 2015). Some found the rejection reasons change as 
the prospects move through the stages (Croce et al., 2017), 
while others found little variation in why investors rejected 
deals at the various stages (Carpentier & Suret, 2015). A 
longitudinal study found investors reject prospects based 
more on investor fit as they gain experience Petty & Gruber 
(2011). Indeed, several studies indicated a lack of investor 
fit, which considers factors such as investment size, com-
patibility with the existing portfolio, and the investor’s per-
sonal experience, is the leading reason (~30%) why in-
vestors reject certain deals (Croce et al., 2017; Harrison et 
al., 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
There has been less agreement about the importance of 
the entrepreneur(s) leading the venture. Petty & Gruber 
(2011) found VCs reject only two percent of the prospects 
for the people involved, whereas Mason and colleagues 
(2017) found BAs cited the people involved as a reason to 
reject a prospect 69 percent of the time. Other studies 
pegged people as the reason for rejection about ten percent 
of the time (Croce et al., 2017; Harrison et al., 2015). Recent 
systematic reviews of the extant literature on the criteria 
investors use when evaluating deals (Ferrati & Muffatto, 
2021; Granz et al., 2020) indicate a rough balance in the 
importance of the entrepreneur(s) and the other aspects of 
the venture. Granz and colleagues (2020) found VCs tilted 
slightly more toward the financial aspects of the venture 
while BAs focused a bit more on the entrepreneur(s). 
Methodology 
Sample 
This project’s data arose from a novel economic develop-
ment effort in a small southwestern city in the United States 
(MSA population of 150,000). The city had a long-stand-
ing, conventional business recruitment effort run by the lo-
cal Chamber of Commerce to persuade larger companies to 
establish business operations in the city. A group of local 
business leaders formed an entity called the “Growth Fund” 
(G.F.) to purchase small manufacturing businesses, relocat-
ing some or all company operations to the G.F.'s home city 
as part of an economic development strategy. Thirty-five in-
vestors joined the G.F. and provided sufficient seed capi-
tal to fund operations for one year. Over that year, the G.F. 
screened dozens of businesses and gave serious attention 
to 20 small businesses (all but one of the businesses had 
less than 30 employees) as a potential acquisition. However, 
none of those potential deals came to fruition, which led to 
the group suspending operations after the first year. As we 
discuss later in the paper, several of the G.F. members ret-
rospectively acknowledged they wished the G.F had contin-
ued beyond a year. 
The G.F. operated as a hybrid between a traditional PE 
group focused on the lower middle market and a traditional 
angel group. As in most angel groups, each G.F. member 
made their own investment decisions. The G.F. did not have 
a pool of pre-raised capital to deploy. About half of the 
G.F.‘s members also belonged to a local angel investment 
group, which used this same principle of having every in-
vestor responsible for their own decisions. Much as the 
managing partners do in a PE group, the G.F. hired a full-
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time executive director (E.D.) to source and screen potential 
deals. The E.D. was uniquely qualified, having fifteen years’ 
experience as a CEO and business group leader for a PE 
company. During that tenure in PE, the E.D. participated in 
seven acquisitions, so he was well versed in the PE acquisi-
tion model. The G.F.'s focus was on small, product-oriented 
manufacturing companies. Like many PE groups, the G.F. 
desired companies with significant ownership and manage-
ment stability, anticipating that such companies were ripe 
for cost reductions, managerial enhancements, and product 
innovations that would allow substantial profit growth after 
changing ownership (Dawson & Barrédy, 2018). The G.F. 
had a six-member Executive Committee (E.C.), whose role 
was to work with the E.D. to vet potential deals before 
bringing them to the membership as a proposed acquisi-
tion. The E.C. had veterans of the banking, oil and gas, med-
ical supply, restaurant, and real estate industries. The E.C. 
brought only one potential deal to the membership, and it 
did not receive sufficient interest to go forward. As we de-
velop later, this lack of success had to do with both the po-
tential buyers and the sellers 
Of the twenty screened deals, nine involved rural busi-
nesses, six businesses were located in small cities (pop-
ulations less than 200,000 and well separate from larger 
cities), and five were located in large cities or their suburbs. 
While the metropolitan businesses might have had access 
to greater resources, the companies were similar to the oth-
ers in terms of size, sole or family ownership, and a desire 
to exit the business. As seen later, the reasons the deals did 
not succeed were also similar to the other companies. Table 
1 has more details about the 20 companies. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The 20 companies represented mini-cases that allowed 
the authors to access the qualitative insights from each 
deal. Using mini-cases as data sources is well-established 
in the entrepreneurship literature and have been used to 
examine issues such as entrepreneurial failure (e.g., Singh 
et al., 2015), venture strategy-making (Ott & Eisenhardt, 
2020), crowdfunding (Murray et al., 2020), and even how 
entrepreneurs name their ventures (Engel et al., 2020). 
Given the challenges of accessing decision-makers for these 
types of deals, it is common to rely on data from one group 
(Mason et al., 2019). The authors were able to incorporate 
taxonomies from earlier research into why VC and BA deals 
did not close, which provided a helpful start to code the in-
terviews. 
The E.D provided the authors with materials he had col-
lected about each business. These materials provided lim-
ited background information about the companies but had 
no information about the E.C.'s decision-making processes 
or outcomes about the companies. One of the paper’s au-
thors attended the group session where the G.F. member-
ship reviewed the only deal recommended by the E.C.. That 
gave the author significant insights into why the member-
ship rejected that one company. 
To gather detailed insights into why the E.C. rejected 
the other nineteen companies, the authors interviewed the 
group’s E.D. and three members of the E.C.. These inter-
views offered “rich, empirical data, especially when the 
phenomenon of interest is highly episodic and infrequent” 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 28). This contrasts with 
Petty and Gruber’s (2011) and Carpentier and Suret’s (2015) 
studies, which used archival information. Given the induc-
tive nature of the research, the interview method seemed 
well suited to analyzing the twenty cases. To minimize con-
cerns about bias, we followed Eisenhardt and Graebner’s 
(2007) advice and used multiple, knowledgeable informants 
rather than relying on a single informant’s recollection. The 
interview approach also represented a form of engaged 
scholarship (Bansal et al., 2018), as one of the authors as-
sisted in establishing the G.F., infrequently consulted on 
G.F. matters, and routinely interacted with the E.D. and 
E.C. members about non-G.F. matters. The interviews took 
place two years after the G.F. ended. As would be expected, 
the E.D. had detailed recollections of each deal; the E.C. 
members had less detailed recollections. They were quick 
to acknowledge these gaps, which reduces concern about 
impression management biases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). 
The authors used the grid of rejection categories and 
sub-categories (Table 2) initially developed by Petty and 
Gruber (2011) and then refined by Carpentier & Suret 
(2015) to code the interviews independently. With a modi-
fied Delphi approach (A. Yu et al., 2012), we employed three 
steps to generate our data for further analyses. The first 
step was to create a master data matrix for the next stage 
of data recording. One of the authors listened to the four 
interviewees’ recollections and decided the main themes 
(e.g., company name, founded year, location, asking price, 
etc.). Second, the researchers independently listened to the 
four interviews to jot down the key points of these 20 pos-
sible deals. At the end of this second step, we did not find 
any additional themes for this matrix. That is, we were able 
to include all of the details we needed using the original 
set of main themes we derived. The third step was that we 
independently used the grid (Table 2) to record our judg-
ments about the reasons the deal did not close. After com-
paring our codes, we found we had 99% of agreement on 
the coded categories; we then reconciled the very few re-
maining areas of disagreement. The reconciliation was sim-
ple because there was a remarkable agreement between the 
E.D. and E.C. members’ views of why the deals did not close. 
We listened to the interviews and discussed the differences 
to reach a consensus. In some cases, the interviews sug-
gested there were multiple reasons why the deal failed. In 
those cases, the authors determined which issue was the 
primary reason versus the secondary reason for the failure. 
Results 
Issues associated with the G.F.'s specific needs and ex-
pectations caused the group to walk away from 35 percent 
(seven of the twenty) of the deals. In one case, the G.F. was 
not interested in the product category, but in four cases, the 
firm could not easily relocate to the G.F.'s small city. The 
E.C. deemed another business as too small to be interest-
ing. The G.F. rejected the last deal principally because the 
E.C. had decided the G.F. would not succeed and did not se-
riously consider the deal. 
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Table 1. Summary of Screened Companies and Deal Failure Reason 
Company 
Pseudonym 








Almost failed two years previous to G.F. interest, but currently stable. Owners just wanted to exit without losing more 
money. Few competitors in the niche industry. 
340 125 
Ranch 2 Rural 
Asking price 7x multiple of reported cash flow. No marketing but well-known and regarded business among its 
customers. Leader in a small niche. 
340 
Tank 1 Rural 
Founder owned and led with very little documentation, financial or otherwise. An industry leader in a niche market but 





Repaired / fabricated parts with a single industry focus. Owner / key employee personal relationships with customers 
key to business’s consistent revenue. 
440 514 
Fab 1 Metro 
Sales were declining due to the poor health of several key family members / workers. The owner was loyal to the 
workforce and reluctant to see the business relocated. 
121 514 
Machine 2 Metro 
Strong financial performer with founder looking to exit while still young. Major multinational corporation accounted 
for 90% of revenue. Relocation was problematic. 
514 110 
Fab 2 Rural 
Produced about 10 dies per year for average selling price of $150,000. Significant investments in land and facilities 
made relocation financially difficult. 
514 
Transpo 1 Rural 
Owner had already sold the business once but repurchased it after the previous buyer almost caused the business to 
fail. The business was still off the previous peak. 
513 320 
Fab 3 Metro 
Current owner’s relationships with relatively small clientele would be hard to replicate. Produced highly customized 





One multinational corporation accounted for 50% of revenue. The seller wanted a signed LOI before opening books 















The company was a supplier to companies owned by G.F. members. The owner received a competing offer. 552 430 
Transpo 2 Metro 
The company had significant intellectual property and had once ceased production due to manufacturing issues. 
Essentially a startup. 
121 222 
Transpo 3 Metro 
The company had a large, international customer base selling aftermarket products that complement a well-known 
brand. Manufacturing 100% out-sourced. 
511 
Ranch 3 Rural Nationwide customer base, to include utility companies. Aging founder looking for an exit but opposed to relocation. 514 
Tank 2 Rural The company didn’t have a single computer in the work location. No previous marketing; ample markets for expansion. 450 
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Company 
Pseudonym 








A thriving company with the owner looking for new investors more so than new owners. Local operations would 
merely be a satellite of main operations elsewhere in the state. 
514 340 
Tank 3 Rural 
The owner maintained he had rebuffed interest from private equity firms. Claiming $3M in annual revenue with ample 
growth prospects. 
460 340 
Waste 1 Rural The deal emerged late in G.F.’s timeline and probably would have gotten much more interest had it been vetted earlier. 525 340 
Companies are listed in the order of G.F. consideration. 
Ranch signifies the company’s products served the ranching industry. Tank signifies the company’s products are primarily large tanks. Machine signifies the company is a general machine shop with some specialty products. Fab signifies the company’s products were mainly a 
B2B fabrication business. Transpo signifies the company’s products served the transportation market. Service signifies the company provided a specialized service. Waste signifies the company’s products were in the waste management businesses. 
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Twenty-five percent of the potential deals (five cases) 
failed because of disagreements over the firms’ valuation. 
In two of the cases, these breakdowns occurred after sub-
stantial negotiations. In the other three cases, the gap be-
tween the entrepreneur’s asking price and the E.C.'s es-
timate of an acceptable price was so large that the E.C. 
quickly decided the deal was not worth pursuing. The valu-
ation was the secondary reason for three other deals. In one 
case, although the deal did not meet the G.F.'s criteria of re-
locating to its city, some investors in the G.F. might have 
done the deal anyway had the valuation been right. 
Yet another 25 percent of the potential deals (five cases) 
failed to close because of concerns about the entrepreneur. 
The group walked away because it did not believe the entre-
preneur(s) were trustworthy in two cases. In one case, the 
entrepreneurs (it was a team of two) were highly disorga-
nized; the G.F. was not confident it could successfully fill 
in the gaps of procedures and knowledge post-purchase. Fi-
nally, in two cases, the G.F. felt the entrepreneur’s knowl-
edge and relationships with customers were so central to 
its success that the firms’ performance would suffer without 
the entrepreneur. 
The other three deals failed for a variety of reasons. In 
one case, another buyer bought the firm before the G.F. 
could act. In two cases, the G.F. judged the product had lit-
tle hope of future success due to a lack of competitive dif-
ferentiation. Our data also found that the “conflict between 
entrepreneurs” could also be the reason for a business to 
sell. We thus added this item to the grid modified from prior 
studies (Carpentier & Suret, 2015; Petty & Gruber, 2011). 
Table 2 has a summary of the deal failure reasons. The table 
also reveals that valuation (8 counts, 40% of the 20 cases) 
and out of investor focus—geography (6 counts, 30% of the 
20 cases) were the two main reasons why the small deals did 
not close in our study. The third reason had two counts for 
no USP (unique selling proposition)/competitive differenti-
ation, key man issue, and integrity/ethics concerns. 
Discussion 
These results have at least five practical implications for 
rural entrepreneurs who aspire to sell their businesses. 
First, firm valuation is the most common deal breaker in our 
investigation of these small deals. Forty percent of the deals 
failed, at least partly, due to the sellers and potential buy-
ers being too far apart on an agreed price or deal structure. 
For example, one family manufacturing firm founded by two 
brothers was the leading company in its niche market but 
wanted a very high price (i.e., seven times reported cash 
flow). The E.D. and E.C. thought this business had great po-
tential and was a good fit for the G.F. Unfortunately, the 
deal did not close despite extensive G.F. efforts due to the 
big valuation difference between the G.F. and the family 
business owners. Astrachan & Jaskiewicz (2008) proposed 
that family business owners usually factor emotional value 
into their business valuation on top of the financial value. 
Hence, in the family business owner’s mind, the firm’s total 
value is the sum of financial value plus emotional value. 
From this perspective, both the buyer and seller may con-
sider the role emotional value plays in the negotiation 
process. While this value discrepancy is probably unsurpris-
ing, it is a useful reminder to rural entrepreneurs who con-
sider a business sale that they will likely have to accept a 
lower price than desired. Likewise, the buyer may also con-
sider the small business owners’ emotional value to reach 
an agreeable price. 
Second, based on these results, rural entrepreneurs look-
ing to exit should anticipate that it will be more challenging 
to find a buyer than it is for more urban entrepreneurs. 
While the G.F.'s criteria of finding re-locatable businesses 
may seem idiosyncratic, rural entrepreneurs may find a rel-
atively smaller population of interested buyers unless the 
business can be relocated. Prospective rural entrepreneurs 
are often specific in location desires. It’s not that they sim-
ply wish for a rural lifestyle; they wish to live in the com-
munity where they grew up and have family (L. Yu & Artz, 
2019). Hence, only prospective entrepreneurs in the busi-
ness’s immediate area may be interested in purchasing the 
company. Alternatively, the rural entrepreneur may have to 
confront the difficult decision to sell to a buyer who in-
tends to relocate the business to their preferred area. Some 
potential sellers may refuse such opportunities out of alle-
giance to workers (one case for G.F.), allegiance to the com-
munity (one case for G.F.), or a strong desire to include real 
estate in the deal (one case for G.F.). Even if the rural entre-
preneur is willing to allow relocation, the customer base or 
specific location advantages may preclude a relocation (two 
cases for G.F.). 
A third practical implication is that there are many rea-
sons why deals do not happen. Just as there are myriad rea-
sons why BAs and VCs chose not to invest in startups (e.g. 
Croce et al., 2017; Harrison et al., 2015; Petty & Gruber, 
2011), there are myriad reasons beyond deal valuation and 
location why a rural entrepreneur’s business does not sell 
easily. Perhaps most surprising to us is the number of deals 
derailed due to ethics concerns about the potential seller. 
But issues such as product category or the lack of a unique 
selling proposition also resulted in deal failures. 
The fourth practical implication is that successful entre-
preneurs with small businesses—rural and otherwise—have 
a paradox that the very elements of their competitive ad-
vantage may reduce their business value when it comes 
time to sell. In two cases, the G.F. concluded the business 
would suffer without the entrepreneur’s detailed tacit 
knowledge of the business and extensive relationships with 
stakeholders. These entrepreneurs effectively differentiated 
their companies from their competitors and enjoyed a sus-
tainable competitive advantage (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). 
However, because one cannot easily transfer those elements 
of differentiation, much of the business value is not truly 
“for sale.” Hence, to avoid selling their business at a steep 
discount, rural entrepreneurs have to build a supportive 
team that intentionally diminishes their personal contribu-
tions to the business before attempting to sell the business. 
The final practical implication is about the socioemo-
tional wealth (SEW) concerns of family businesses (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). SEW is a family firm’s affective endow-
ment, indicating the family’s attachment to and 
non-financial expectations for its business. Because family 
businesses are composed of family and business systems, 
each system has its goals, making family business a more 
complex organizational form (A. Yu et al., 2012). In the 20 
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Table 2. Summary of Deal Failure Reasons 
  
Primary Reason Deal 
Failed 
Secondary Reason Deal 
Failed 
Category Code    
Product and 
Model 





 122 Not convincing/compelling   
 123 Need proof of concept   
 124 Single product   
 125 Too basic  1 
 126 Complexity   
 130 IP related   
Market 210 Existence/clarity   
 221 Too small or niche   
 222 Too crowded/competitive  1 
 223 Too fragmented   
 224 Too large/mature   
 230 Acceptance/potential   
 240 Regulations   
Financial 310 Exit   
 320 Revenue/return potential  2 
 330 Use of proceeds   
 340 Valuation 5 3 
Team 410 Experience 
420 Reputation 
430 Lack of confidence 1 
440 Key man issue 2 
450 No/incomplete management 1 





Out of investor focus (OIF)--
Product 
1  
 512 OIF—Stage   
 513 OIF—Size 1  
 514 OIF—geography 4 2 
 515 Just not a G.F. deal   
 521 Competes with existing portfolio   
 522 
Not appropriate for portfolio at 
this time 
  
 523 Too early for fund   
 524 No funds for region   
 525 
No time due to fund related 
activities 
1  
 530 External source did not endorse  
541 Need lead investor 
542 Oversubscribed 
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Primary Reason Deal 
Failed 
Secondary Reason Deal 
Failed 
543 Existing investor interest 
544 Lack of other investors 
551 No response 
552 Deal closed by other investors 1 
553 Not invited to participate 
554 Terms rejected 
555 Decided not to sell at all 1 
Other 600 Conflict between entrepreneurs 1 
cases, six cases (30%) were family firms, but they did not 
prioritize a succession plan over selling the business. The 
E.D. considered family businesses an ideal target to acquire 
since family firms are more long-term oriented (Lumpkin 
et al., 2010) and more likely to fit the criteria of the G.F. A 
possible reason behind such an impression is that a fam-
ily’s name is on the business, so the family has to protect 
its reputation and identity to preserve SEW. Among these 
six family firms, four had challenges allowing a relocation, 
demonstrating that family entrepreneurs are very commu-
nity-oriented. For example, one of the family owners was 
very loyal to employees and viewed them as family. Such 
a family mindset helps a family firm create trust, steward-
ship, and competitive advantages but makes it harder to sell 
the business. 
Deal and Group Epilogue 
The authors are aware of subsequent events in a few 
of the deals. The G.F. missed one deal because another 
buyer purchased the business before the G.F. could act. That 
proved to be fortuitous, as that machining business failed 
during a deep industry downturn. One of the deals the G.F. 
pursued most aggressively but ultimately could not close 
due to disagreements over valuation eventually sold several 
years later. The authors, unfortunately, do not have any in-
formation about the sales price. Finally, the G.F. rejected 
one deal as being too small. After the G.F. ceased opera-
tions, the E.D. bought that business with the blessing of the 
E.C. Instead of relocating the business, he chose to relocate 
to the business’s rural location. The E.D. has improved mar-
keting, implemented product enhancements, and stream-
lined processes such that annual revenue and profit have 
soared without growing the workforce. It can be argued that 
it was precisely the type of business the G.F. wanted. 
This idea of local investors banding together to support 
economic development seems logical yet did not work sat-
isfactorily in this situation. Through the interviews, we 
gained insights into the challenges associated with this ver-
sion of economic development. From the beginning, the 
G.F. struggled with the twin priorities of investor return and 
economic development. While the priorities are not mu-
tually exclusive, some deals appeared more promising for 
economic development, and other deals appeared to offer 
greater investor returns. In two cases, the G.F. continued 
due diligence on deals that could not relocate to the host 
city (and thus would not offer economic development ben-
efits) because the E.C. thought the deals might offer strong 
investor returns. Had the investors proceeded with those 
deals, it would have reduced the capital available for eco-
nomic development deals. In retrospect, the interviewees 
wished the group had exercised more patience, judging that 
one year was too optimistic to expect a solid first deal. 
Finding that solid first deal is important for an economic 
strategy because an excellent first acquisition can serve as 
the parent company for subsequent deals. One interviewee 
wished the G.F. had completed one of the machine shop 
deals, even if that deal was not particularly appealing, so it 
could have served as a parent for some smaller deals. Sev-
eral interviewees commented that the distributed nature of 
the decision-making meant no one emerged as a “cham-
pion” for any deals. They wished someone would have got-
ten behind one or a few deals and pushed harder. In this 
aspect, the group perhaps needed to operate more like a tra-
ditional PE group and less like an angel group. 
The G.F. experience did set the stage for subsequent ma-
jor investment. About a year after the G.F. ceased oper-
ations, several members became aware of the opportu-
nity—working with a small PE group not located in the 
region—to purchase a 250-employee manufacturing com-
pany and relocate some or all its operations to the host 
city. This deal did go forward, with former G.F. members in-
vesting several million dollars to make the purchase. Un-
fortunately, the deal became a case study about the risks of 
turning around a distressed business. After an aborted at-
tempt at a partial relocation and significant cash infusions 
to cover continuing losses, the local investors took a total 
loss on the deal after a bankruptcy sale. 
We add to the literature in several ways. First, our study 
is one of the first to explore small deal acquisitions to our 
knowledge. We respond to Carpentier & Suret's (2015: 819) 
call to pay attention to small deals. Our cases provide some 
initial evidence showing why small deals are difficult to 
close and reveal the reasons behind the scene. Second, 
emerging from our data, “conflict between entrepreneurs” 
is another possible reason to sell a small business. We added 
this item to the grid developed by Petty & Gruber (2011) and 
Carpentier & Suret (2015). Future research may modify our 
grid to conduct similar studies in economic development or 
small deals. Third, over the coding process, we found the 
E.D. and the other three members of the E.C. were the pri-
mary decision-makers to decide if a deal should be moved 
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forward. Notably, we suggest the heterogeneity of the deal 
evaluators may be an important factor in dealmaking. In 
both Petty and Gruber’s (2011) and Carpentier and Suret’s 
(2015) data analyses, they consistently assumed the homo-
geneity of deal decisions. We consider the relationship be-
tween the deal evaluation/evaluators and deal closing as an 
interesting research opportunity worthy of further probing. 
Finally, we provide insights into a novel economic develop-
ment effort, particularly the inherent tension between in-
vestor and economic development goals. Our research may 
provide some thoughts for those businesses, institutions, 
or policymakers to make plans and provide incentives or 
grants. 
Inevitably, our research entails several important limita-
tions. First, our data are not longitudinal. Although we had 
some more information after the cessation of G.F. on a few 
cases, we did not have enough information to pursue a more 
long-term study. It would be helpful to see, for example, 
if the G.F.‘s evaluation of those firms’ valuation was rea-
sonable. In doing so, buyers and sellers may learn a better 
approach to developing reasonable offers. Second, as with 
Petty & Gruber (2011) and Carpentier and Suret (2015), our 
research is qualitative. We thus do not have enough sam-
ple size to test the relationship between two or three vari-
ables. Future research may build on our findings by deploy-
ing our updated grid to a larger number of respondents 
via a survey. Questions future researchers might ask in-
clude: How does the heterogeneity of investment evalua-
tors’ background affect the decision-making process and re-
sults? What are those essential factors contributing to the 
difference in firm valuation between a buyer and seller? 
Compared to nonfamily businesses, do family firms expect 
a higher price? If yes/no, why? Third, although we used a 
grid developed from prior studies, the coding ultimately in-
volves some subjectivity. Fortunately, we used a modified 
Delphi approach and two independent coders to code the 
data in our data coding process. We found a high degree of 
similarity in our results. Future research may add a hold-out 
group to code the data again and compare the results. Thus, 
this additional step will further lower the subjective bias. 
Last, interview data may contain recall bias (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). To deal with this issue, we asked all of the 
deal evaluators (one E.D. and three members of E.C.) to pro-
vide their thoughts on each deal. We then cross-validated 
the interviews to reduce the recall bias and caught comple-
mentary information a single informant could miss. 
Conclusion 
Overall, we agree with Petty & Gruber's (2011: 185) in-
sights “that many of the deals categorized as dead were the 
result of action by the company rather than rejection by the 
VC should provide evidence that the world of VC is both 
a buyer’s and a seller’s market.” Based on our study, the 
reasons small deals are not done have to do with both the 
buyer and the seller. Those businesses rejected by G.F. may 
have had the right valuation and great potential, but the 
G.F. simply was not the correct buyer. That should encour-
age rural entrepreneurs not to obsess over failed deals. Al-
ternatively, the seller may have had unrealistic financial ex-
pectations or behaved in a manner that became odious to 
the prospective buyer. These are deal-killers under the con-
trol of rural entrepreneurs aspiring to sell their businesses. 
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